Congressman Michael Baumgartner introduced the MATCH Act on April 2, 2026, with bipartisan backing and companion Senate legislation from Senators Pete Ricketts and Andy Kim. The bill would give allies 150 days to align their semiconductor export controls with U.S. restrictions. After that window closes, the U.S. could block American companies from servicing equipment makers who don't comply. As Select Committee on China Chairman John Moolenaar put it, China exploited loopholes in current export controls to buy equipment as part of its strategy to dominate in chips.
The legislation names specific Chinese companies, including Huawei, SMIC, YMTC, CXMT, and Hua Hong, and would prohibit sales of critical semiconductor manufacturing equipment to countries of concern.
That 150-day deadline is aimed at companies like ASML, the Dutch lithography giant. ASML's most advanced machines rely on American parts and software, which means Washington can pressure even foreign companies. If the Netherlands doesn't tighten its own export rules, ASML could lose access to the U.S. components and servicing that keep its machines running worldwide. That's not hypothetical. When the U.S. restricted chipmaking equipment sales to China, Japanese and Dutch companies kept selling similar tools because their governments hadn't matched Washington's rules. China imported a record $4 billion in semiconductor equipment from the Netherlands in 2024, much of it through ASML.
The tension for U.S. equipment makers is real. Applied Materials, Lam Research, and KLA historically get 40 to 50 percent of their revenue from China. They've lobbied hard for multilateral alignment because unilateral restrictions just hand market share to competitors like Japan's Tokyo Electron and ASML without actually slowing China down. The industry tolerates controls on leading-edge chips but worries about legacy chip restrictions, which drive serious revenue. Senator Ricketts framed the current situation as one where U.S. restrictions are stronger than those of close allies, putting American companies last.
The bill's real test will be whether it actually pressures allies or just creates friction. Recent history suggests arm-twisting works, but the semiconductor supply chain is tangled enough that heavy-handed moves carry real costs for the U.S. companies this bill claims to protect.